Trial experience, satisfaction and incentive to bring another lawsuit: Does aspiration level influence winners and losers? by Yamamura, Eiji
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Trial experience, satisfaction and
incentive to bring another lawsuit: Does
aspiration level influence winners and
losers?
Eiji Yamamura
July 2009
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/16149/
MPRA Paper No. 16149, posted 10. July 2009 00:32 UTC
1 
 
Trial experience, satisfaction and incentive to bring another 
lawsuit: Does aspiration level influence winners and losers?  
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper used individual level data in Japan to explore how a complainant’s past 
trial experience influences their satisfaction and incentive to bring a future lawsuit. 
Controlling for kinds of incidents and a complainant’s individual characteristics, the 
major findings were; (1) there is a positive relationship between the experience and 
satisfaction for winners, whereas there is a significant negative relationship for 
losers, and (2) experience exerts a positive effect on the intention to bring a future 
lawsuit, not only for winners but also for losers. These results imply that, for losers, a 
past experience enhances the incentive to bring a future lawsuit, although the 
experience decreases a complainant’s satisfaction. 
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1. Introduction 
Individuals appear to adapt to circumstances as time passes (Myers 1992, 2000). 
That is, experience can be considered to cause adaptation. In terms of welfare, it has 
been proposed that experience and previous conditions change people’s aspiration 
level through an adaptation process that reduces people’s satisfaction (e.g., Frey and 
Stutzer. 2002a,2002b; Statzer 2004). Change of aspiration level is useful for 
explaining the finding that economic growth is not associated with the happiness of 
people in developed countries over time (Easterlin 1974; 1995). Besides the 
relationship between income and happiness, aspiration change has a significant role 
in the determination of people’s satisfaction about outcomes of various economic 
behaviors. With respect to human behavior, as presented in habit formation theory, 
preference change is reflected in demand behavior (e.g., Pollack 1970; Carroll et al., 
2000). Hence, aspiration level is anticipated to influence not only satisfaction but 
also behavior. Such a relationship has not been fully investigated. The first focus of 
this paper is to explore how and the extent to which aspiration is relevant to 
behavior. 
There appear other channels through which experience has an effect on 
satisfaction and behavior. People can accumulate know-how through experience, 
resulting in improvements in efficiency. The more affluent people’s experiences are, 
the lower cost people incur to achieve the same result. Hence, experience leads 
people to repeat the action. Also, assuming that people can acquire the same benefit 
from the action, people are more satisfied if the cost for the action becomes smaller. If 
this is the case, experience is positively related to satisfaction as well as behavior. 
The second focus of this paper is to examine the extent to which learning from 
experience has an effect on satisfaction and behavior. 
If the positive learning effect outweighs the negative aspiration effect on 
satisfaction, experience has a positive effect on satisfaction. On the other hand, if the 
latter outweighs the former, experience has a negative effect. Considering change of 
aspiration and efficiency improvement together, whether experience is positively 
associated with satisfaction and behavior is not evident. The effect of experience 
might depend on the degree of benefit people obtained. This is why, for instance, a 
negative aspiration effect on satisfaction disappears when the benefit becomes larger 
than the aspiration level. This paper, therefore, attempts to divide its sample 
according to benefit, and then to examine how experience affects not only satisfaction 
but also behavior.  
In legal reform in Japan, policy makers aim to encourage people to bring lawsuits 
and so raise the satisfaction of those involved. For this purpose, a survey of those 
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bringing civil actions was conducted. The survey data includes variables regarding 
the past experience of bringing a lawsuit, the result of the present lawsuit, self-rated 
satisfaction about the result of the lawsuit, and intention to bring a future lawsuit 
(for the purposes of this paper, “to reuse”). This data is seen as valuable for an 
analysis of satisfaction and behavior. Thanks to information about the result of the 
present lawsuit, the sample can be divided into winners and losers according to the 
relevant benefit from the lawsuit. The present paper uses this survey data since it 
allows me to compare the experience effect for winners with that for losers in the 
lawsuit. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 establishes the 
setting for the study. Section 3 explains the data and methods used.  Section 4 
discusses the results of the estimations. The final section offers concluding 
observations. 
 
2. Setting (Lawsuits in Japan). 
The measure by which people choose to solve conflict appears to depend not only 
on economic conditions but also on psychological and cultural factors. For instance, 
in Japan, opinions vary about how Japanese people perceive an incident and resolve 
it. According to the classical work of Kawashima (1963), the harmonious nature of 
Japanese society discourages people from litigating. By contrast, Ramseyer and 
Nakazato (1999, Chapter 4) argued that despite the consensual nature of Japanese 
society, people do not ignore the law and assert their rights. Ginsburg and Hoetker 
(2006) find no supporting evidence for the hypothesis that cultural factors play a 
major role in Japan. It has been pointed out that because of the institutional 
incapacity of the legal system, judges and lawyers are not available in sufficient 
numbers, resulting in an increased cost of litigation (Haley 1978). In response to 
these arguments, in 1999, the government of Japan established the Justice System 
Reform Council (JSRC hereafter) to study basic policies for modifying the legal 
system. To increase the use of lawsuits, the legal reform presented by the JSRC had 
three pillars in order (JSRC 2001, Chapter I Part 3) 1. One was to “meet public 
expectations”2. Therefore, the justice system would be made easier to use, easier to 
                                                   
1 A number of studies examine the Japan’s legal system in the field of economics (e.g., 
Kinoshita 2000,2002; Ginsburg and Hoetker 2006; Yamamura 2008).  
2 The other two pillars are “establishment of a popular base” and "the legal 
profession supporting the justice system". For establishment of the popular base, the 
people need to deepen their understanding of the justice system through various 
forms of involvement including participation in certain legal proceedings, and shall 
support the justice system (JSRC 2001, Chapter 1). Therefore, the lay judge system 
was introduced from 2009.For the purpose of supporting the justice system, and 
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understand, and more reliable (JSRC 2001, Chapter I Part 3).  
For the legal reform to be successful, and to significantly enhance people’s use of 
lawsuits, a decrease in the cost of such actions would be necessary. Above all, 
transaction costs such as those involved in searching for a lawyer appear to be large. 
If people bring a lawsuit, they are likely to acquire know-how about lawsuits through 
their experience, resulting in a decrease in the transaction costs. Hence, people with 
experience of a lawsuit are expected to reuse lawsuits because of the smaller cost of 
the next lawsuit. On the other hand, a user’s satisfaction of the system needs to be 
investigated to ensure the system meets public expectations3. Therefore, I considered 
the question of how the experience of a lawsuit influences a user’s satisfaction to be 
important. Satisfaction is thought to be largely due to a decrease in the cost of a 
lawsuit through past experience, if other things are equal. From the point of view of 
traditional economics, the learning effect on intention to reuse is expected to be the 
same as that on satisfaction. This conjecture is, however, not obvious since past 
experience appears to have other influences on reuse and satisfaction.  
Preferences are considered to depend on past experience (Day 1986). Individuals 
are temporally affected by circumstance changes, though they gradually fully adapt 
to the circumstances (Myers 1992, 2000). The adaptation is thought to cause 
aspiration change, which influences one’s satisfaction (Easterlin 2001; Stutzer 2004). 
If this holds in the case of a lawsuit, “adaptation” possibly occurs through the 
experience of the lawsuit, which affects the aspirations about benefits from the 
lawsuit.  Recently, it has been pointed out that whether aspiration tends to change 
or not depends on domains (Easterlin, 2005). No speculation has, however, taken 
place concerning the effect of the past experience on lawsuit satisfaction. Moreover, 
the existing literature has not examined the question whether aspiration change 
affects the intention to reuse. It seems interesting to examine how people’s 
aspirations about lawsuits change, thereby making differences in the effects 
experience have on satisfaction and intention to reuse.  
Aspiration level is thought to be affected not only by the number of experiences of 
a lawsuit but also by the results of lawsuits. Hence, satisfaction and intention to 
reuse depend on whether one wins or not. From the view point of policy making, the 
                                                                                                                                                
securing a legal profession that is rich both in quality and quantity. To this end, the 
new bar examination was introduced. 
3 Various kinds of subjective satisfaction were analyzed (Frey and Stutzer 2002a; 
2002b). Above all, life satisfaction(e.g., Easterlin 1995, 2001, 2005; Stutzer 2004; 
Clark et al., 2008; Caporale et al. 2009) and job satisfaction(e.g., Antecol and 
Cobb-Clark, 2009; Clark et al., 2009;Jones and Sloane, 2009) drew a much attention 
of researchers. 
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efficacy of the system, however, should not be affected by whether an individual wins 
or not. It is necessary to encourage people to reuse even if they have previously been 
a loser. To provide evidence useful for policy making, it is necessary to investigate 
how the effects of past experience are affected by whether one becomes a winner or 
not. Hence, this paper attempts to show past trial experience affects satisfaction and 
intention to reuse, and to compare the effects of the experience of winners with those 
of losers in lawsuits. 
 
3. Data and methodology   
3.1. Data 
This paper uses individual level data constructed from the Survey of Civil Action 
Users conducted in 2000 (SCAU 2000 hereafter) and that in 2006(SCAU2006 
hereafter)4. The survey of civil action users was conducted to provide fundamental 
data to explore “the state of the civil action system which is easy to use for people”. 
The subjects of the survey are those concerned with incidents that have been settled 
by a civil-affairs lawsuit in a district court. A total of 4,537 individuals and 
corporations were invited to participate in the survey. The survey collected data on 
1,512 individuals and corporations, a response rate of 33.3%. Respondents for 
corporations were those in charge of judicial matters; therefore, the data about a 
corporation could be said to reflect a personal perception. Nevertheless, because of 
the design of the questionnaire, the information about the characteristics of the 
respondents for corporations could not be obtained. This is why this paper is limited 
the sample of individuals.  
The construction of samples used in this research is shown in Table 1. The 
original sample contained 1512 observations; 920 were individuals. The sample size 
was reduced to 536 when the sample was limited to the complainant 5 . Some 
observations were deleted because of missing values for satisfaction about the result 
of the lawsuit and/or intention to reuse. Furthermore, after excluding observations 
without valid answers for individual characteristics such as age, education, and 
                                                   
4 Data for this secondary analysis were from the "Survey of civil action user (Minji 
Sosho Riyo-sha Chosa)”. The first survey was conducted by Justice System Reform 
Council (Shiho Seido Kaikaku Shingi-kai) in 2000. The second survey was done by 
Japan Law Foundation (Nichiben-ren Homu Kenkyu-zaidan) in 2006. These data 
were provided by the Social Science Japan Data Archive, Information Center for 
Social Science Research on Japan, Institute of Social Science, The University of 
Tokyo. 
5 The definition of a winner is different for complainants and defendants. Hence, for 
the purpose of avoiding difficulties defining a winner, the sample is restricted to 
complainants. 
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household income, the sample size became 360. As shown in TableA1, the data 
includes individual characteristics such as demographic characteristics (age and sex), 
household income, and education. In addition, the data contains the kinds of 
incidents dealt by the lawsuit (money, land, accident, divorce and others)6.The 
observations divided into winners and losers were 267 and 93, respectively. These 
observations were used for the OLS estimation, and the results are shown in Tables 3 
and 4.  
 
3.2. Methodology 
Variable definitions and the basic statistics of the key variables used for 
estimations are reported in Table 2.   
The estimated function takes the following form: 
SATIS (or REUSE) imn= 0 + 1 EXPEimn + 2 LAWYER imn +3AMOUNTimn +ei+ fn + 
uin , 
where SATIS in (or REUSE in) represents the dependent variable in complaint i and 
incident n. ’s represents regression parameters. ei is a vector of a complainant’s 
individual characteristics captured by the dummy variables shown in Table A1.  fn 
is a vector of the kinds of incidents captured by the dummy variables in Table A1. 
uimn represents an error term. The dependent variable is the self-rated satisfaction 
about the result of a lawsuit and the intention to reuse. Self-rated satisfaction was 
measured using the question “Are you satisfied with the result of the lawsuit?”. The 
responses could run from 0 (dissatisfied) to 5 (very satisfied). The intention to reuse 
is measured using the question “In a situation where you encountered the same 
incident in the future, would you resolve the mater by bringing a lawsuit?” The 
responses could run from 0 (not willing at all) to 5 (willing very much). Following 
Stutzer (2004), to make the interpretation of the result easier, OLS estimation is 
employed for the empirical estimations in this paper. As shown in APPENDIX 
(Tables A2 and A3), the results of the average marginal effects in Ordered Probit 
estimations are very similar to those of OLS estimations7. This suggests that the 
findings as discussed below are robust with regard to methodology. 
A cursory examination of Fig 1 reveals that the degree of a winner’s intention to 
reuse is higher than that of a loser’s, consistent with the intuition. As for satisfaction, 
                                                   
6 The incidents fall into 15 categories in SCAU2000 and 9 categories in SCAU2006. I 
then divided them into 5 categories to combine SCAU2000 and SCAU2006. 
7 Theoretically, because of the ordinal nature of the dependent variables, Ordered 
Probit analysis or Ordered Logit analysis would be more appropriate and so has been 
used in the literature concerning satisfaction (e.g., Di Tella et al., 2003; Easterlin 
2006; Caporale et al., 2009).  
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I see from Fig 2 that winners are likely to feel higher satisfaction than losers. What 
is observed in Figs 1 and 2 leads me to argue that the result of a lawsuit influences 
not only the satisfaction but also the intention to reuse. To investigate how the result 
of a lawsuit influences the determinant factors, the sample is divided into winners 
and losers, and then estimations are conducted using each sample. In this paper, a 
winner is defined as one who obtains monetary or non-monetary satisfaction. This 
definition does not vary according to the amount or the degree of satisfaction8. The 
loser is defined as those who could not obtain satisfaction at all. 
Independent variables used for the estimation are as follows. The past trial 
experience is incorporated to capture both the learning effect and the aspiration 
change effect. Let me begin by discussing the effect of learning on satisfaction and 
intention to reuse. People with experience are considered to have a greater 
knowledge about trial procedures and what is needed to be done. Therefore, they are 
able to improve the efficiency of a lawsuit by reducing costs such search costs for a 
lawyer and the time-cost for obtaining knowledge about a lawsuit. I thus expect that 
the trial experience lowers the cost, leading people to reuse when another incident 
occurs. It follows from this that EXPE is expected to take positive signs when 
estimations of intention to reuse are conducted. Assuming that the result is 
unchanged, satisfaction about a lawsuit’s result seems to increase as the cost of a 
lawsuit decreases. Hence, experienced people are more satisfied with a lawsuit’s 
result than inexperienced ones when the lawsuit result is the same for them. The 
anticipated learning effect of experience does not vary as to the result of lawsuit.  
Let me turn to consideration of the effect of aspiration change. As shown in Fig 1, 
winners are more likely to reuse when a similar incident occurs. It follows from this 
that experienced complainants tend to be winners of previous lawsuits. Following the 
argument of aspiration change (Stutzer, 2004), winners are expected to raise the 
aspiration level and their satisfaction depends on difference between the benefit 
aspired to and the actual benefit. As a consequence, experience raises the benefit 
aspired to from a lawsuit, leading to a decrease of satisfaction. This relationship 
between experience and satisfaction is, however, affected by the actual benefit. If 
experienced complainants can get benefits that are larger than those aspired to, 
experience results in an increase of satisfaction.  The aspiration effect of experience 
on satisfaction is expected to be negative for losers, since a loser’s benefit is 0. As for 
an intention to reuse, intuitively, dissatisfaction with the result of a lawsuit reduces 
the motivation to reuse. If this is true, experienced complainants do not intend to 
                                                   
8 The definition of a winner is restricted by the limitations of the data, which does 
not cover the amount and the degree of satisfaction. 
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reuse when they become losers in the current lawsuit. By definition, the benefits of 
winners cover a wide range, so that it is not clear whether an actual benefit 
outweighs the benefit aspired to or not. Hence, the aspiration effect on satisfaction 
and intention to reuse is ambiguous for winners. The expected effects of experience 
as above are summarized in Table 3.  
Lawyers are trial professionals and so have an important role. If the benefit from 
hiring a lawyer outweighs the cost to employ one, people who hire a lawyer are more 
likely to have an intention to reuse. In addition, in the same situation, people who 
hire a lawyer are more satisfied with the lawsuit result. The contribution made by a 
lawyer is thought to be large when people become winners. If this is true, winners 
hiring a lawyer are more likely to reuse and are more satisfied with the result. 
Nevertheless, if the cost to employ a lawyer is larger than the benefit from a lawyer, 
winners hiring a lawyer are less inclined to reuse and are less satisfied with the 
result.  Hence, the signs of LAWYER are ambiguous for winners in the estimations 
of satisfaction and intention to reuse. On the other hand, a contribution made by a 
lawyer is thought to be small when people become losers. If this is the situation, 
losers hiring a lawyer are less likely to reuse and are less satisfied with the result. 
These conclusions lead me to predict that LAWYER takes negative signs for losers in 
estimations of satisfaction and intention to reuse. 
With respect to AMOUNT, the benefit of complainants seems to be mainly derived 
from the amount of money they obtained. By definition, losers, however, cannot enjoy 
any benefit from the lawsuit, resulting in dissatisfaction. The larger the 
dissatisfaction of losers becomes, the larger the expected benefit is. Experience of 
failure to obtain the anticipated larger amount of money causes complainants to 
avoid lawsuits. As a consequence, AMOUNT is anticipated to yield a negative sign 
for losers in estimations of not only satisfaction but also of reuse. For winners, the 
amount of money winner actually obtained is thought to affect the perception of 
complainants9. The amount of money a winner actually obtains is, however, not 
captured. Hence, the sign of AMOUNT is ambiguous in both estimations for winners. 
 
4. Results 
Estimation results of intention to reuse are presented in Table 4 and those of 
satisfaction in Table 5. In both tables, the results of winners and of losers are shown 
in (a) and (b), respectively. In each table, the result includes all independent 
                                                   
9 Even in the case that a complainant wins, it seems plausible that the complainant 
is discontent if he can only obtain non-monetary satisfaction or a small portion of the 
amount of money claimed in the lawsuit. 
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variables in the function as shown in column (1). To check the robustness of the 
results, results of alternative specification appear in columns (2), (3), and (4). To 
compare results appropriately, in addition to the marginal effects of EXPE and 
AMOUNT, elasticity is reported10. Elasticity for LAWYER is, however, not exhibited 
since LAWYER is dummy variable and so there is no difficulty in interpreting the 
marginal effect. 
 
4.1. Intention to reuse 
   I now discuss the results concerning intention to reuse. I see from Table 4(a) and 
(b) that EXPE produces significant positive signs in all estimations. I found it 
interesting that past experience encourages complainants to reuse regardless of 
whether they are winners or not. This suggests that the positive learning effect on 
reuse outweighs the negative aspiration effect. Furthermore, it is interesting to 
observe that its elasticity for losers is 0.02, which is approximately two times larger 
than that for winners. This implies that the experience has a greater effect on reuse 
for losers than for winners. The past experience of a lawsuit makes a greater 
contribution to the enhancement of reuse when complainants cannot obtain any 
benefit in the current lawsuit. From this I derive the argument that the behavior of 
experienced complainants is less likely to be influenced by the result of the current 
lawsuit since their behavior depends not only on the current result but also on the 
results of any previous lawsuits.  
As shown in Table 4 (a) and (b), negative signs of LAWYER appear not only for 
losers but also for winners. This result is in line with the anticipation for losers. 
Since the pass rate for the bar examination has been very low (Kinoshita 2000, 2002), 
there has been an insufficient supply of lawyers into the Japanese market. As a 
consequence, the market for lawyers is not competitive, leading to a decrease in 
lawyers’ incentives to provide good service. This might be the reason why that hiring 
a lawyer has a detrimental effect on the intention to reuse, regardless of a lawsuit’s 
                                                   
10 See more details for Greene (Greene1997, p.280). 
  In the linear model, exy  '  the elasticity of y with respect to changes in x is 
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(Greene 1997, pp. 278-280). 
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result. That is, the less competitive the lawyer market is the more it deteriorates the 
quality of lawyers, resulting in an impediment to reuse. AMOUNT produced positive 
signs for winners while being statistically significant. On the other hand, for losers, 
AMOUNT yields the anticipated negative signs and is significant at the 1 % level. As 
well, absolute values of elasticity for losers are about 15 times larger than those for 
winners. As predicted, the mount of satisfaction that complainants fail to get, has a 
detrimental effect on intention to reuse for losers.  
 
4.2. Satisfaction 
I now turn to the results of the satisfaction estimations. Looking at Table 5(a) 
shows that the coefficient signs of EXPE are positive in all estimations. However, 
they are not statistically significant in columns (2) and (4). My interpretation is that 
learning from past experience leads to a reduction of cost, thereby increasing 
satisfaction for winners. This positive effect of EXPE is, to some extent, attenuated 
by the negative aspiration change effect. As observe in Table 5(b), EXPE yields 
significant negative signs in all estimations, implying that past experience reduces 
satisfaction for losers. This suggests that a negative aspiration change effect 
significantly outweighs a positive learning one. Furthermore, absolute values of 
elasticity for losers are distinctly larger than those for winners. Combining the 
results of winners and losers shows that the aspiration change effect is remarkably 
larger for losers than winners. This might be because winners possibly get larger 
benefits than those involved with aspiration level. Hence, the negative aspiration 
change effect becomes smaller for winners and so is not reflected in the results. 
As for LAWYER, its coefficients show negative signs in all estimations, and are 
statistically insignificant. This is similar to the estimation results of reuse. 
Consistent with the discussion about the result of reuse, competitive pressure in the 
lawyer market is low so that lawyers have little motivation to provide good service. 
As a consequence, because of lawyers’ disappointing performances, users of lawyers 
are dissatisfied with the result of a lawsuit even if they are winners. To improve the 
performance of lawyers, I found it very important to make the lawyer market more 
competitive and then to give lawyers incentives. This supports the direction of legal 
reform to increase the supply of lawyers by introducing a new bar examination. 
Coefficients of AMOUNT take significant positive signs for winners whereas they 
take significant negative ones for losers. Absolute values of elasticity for losers are 15 
times larger than those for winners. These effects of AMOUNT on satisfaction are 
the same as those on intention of reuse.  
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4.3. Discussion 
What has been observed thus far suggests that, for winners, similar results are 
presented in estimations of both intention to reuse and satisfaction. On the other 
hand, for losers, it is interesting that opposite results of EXPE are obtained for the 
estimation of intention to reuse and that of satisfaction. That is, past experience 
encourages complainants to reuse whereas experience does not always increase 
satisfaction. It follows from this that experienced complainants tend to reuse even if 
they are not satisfied with the result of the current lawsuit. This seems to be at odds 
with the view of policy makers that “meeting public expectations” leads to an 
increase in numbers of those bringing lawsuits. In my interpretation, the difference 
of the EXPE effect between intention to reuse and satisfaction might be mainly to the 
result of aspiration change, which is closely related to satisfaction but not to behavior. 
This is in line with the argument that preference changes have stronger implications 
for individual welfare than the prediction of human behavior (Hollander 2001). This 
leads me to argue that aspiration change during the process of adaptation creates a 
gap between welfare and behavior for those who bring lawsuits.  
It is important for legal reform to remove any obstacles that prevent conflict 
resolution in Japan. These obstacles seem to be caused in part by a lack of people’s 
knowledge about lawsuits. Hence, it is necessary to increase potential users’ 
knowledge about how to use a lawsuit. “Making it easier to use” has an important 
role, especially in encouraging inexperienced people to bring a lawsuit, thereby 
increasing their knowledge about lawsuits through learning. This leads to increasing 
people’s choices to deal with conflict when an incident occurs, although whether they 
resolve it formally or informally depends on individual preference.  
 
5. Conclusion 
From the view point of traditional economics, people are thought to acquire 
know-how through experience, which improves their performance. Whereas, 
according to psychological economics, people tend to adapt to circumstance through 
experience and then aspiration level changes, reducing the income effect on 
satisfaction. That is, experience has a negative effect on welfare, but a positive one 
on behavior. It seems plausible that welfare is associated with behavior since 
intuitively satisfaction as an outcome of a behavior leads people to behave more 
positively. It also seems appropriate that improving performance increases 
satisfaction. Considering these effects of interaction between welfare and behavior, it 
is not evident how experience is related to satisfaction and behavior. Thus this paper 
attempted to analyze the effect of experience by examining users’ satisfaction and 
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intention to bring future lawsuits in Japan. 
What comes out of the individual level data about complainants can be 
summarized as follows: (1) a positive relationship between experience and 
satisfaction exists for winners, whereas a significant negative relationship exists for 
losers, and (2) experience exerts a positive effect on the intention to reuse, not only 
for winners but also for losers. These results imply that a past experience has the 
same effect on both satisfaction and intention to reuse for winners, but the 
experience has an opposite one on losers. It is interesting that the effect of experience 
on intention to reuse does not vary according to the lawsuit result, while that on 
satisfaction varies. This might be because a change of aspiration influences 
satisfaction but not intention to reuse. Furthermore, the negative effect of aspiration 
change on satisfaction is larger for losers than for winners. This might be because a 
winner’s benefit possibly outweighs the benefit aspired to. I arrive at the conclusion 
that aspiration change has an influence on satisfaction but not on behavior.   
For an evaluation of economic policy, it is necessary to consider outcomes in terms 
of welfare as well as those of behavior. Legal reform in Japan aims to “make it easier 
to use” a lawsuit to increase users. In this case, aspiration change through 
experience leads to a decrease of satisfaction. On the other hand, while the policy 
improves market conditions by removing obstacle to bringing a lawsuit, whether a 
person brings a lawsuit or not depends on their individual preference. Even if people 
acquire sufficient knowledge and know-how about lawsuits, because of the 
harmonious characteristic of Japanese society, there is the possibility that no drastic 
change in people attitudes towards lawsuits will be brought about. If this is the case, 
it is critical to increase peoples’ choices to deal with conflict, which will increase the 
numbers bringing lawsuits in the long run. 
The benefits winners achieve cover a wide range. This paper does not take into 
account differences among winners so the estimation results for winners suffer from 
bias. Hence, further research considering this issue is called for. Furthermore, this 
research is concerned with a specific issue in a specific place. Thus more 
investigation is needed to examine how aspiration change affects satisfaction and 
behavior.  
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Fig.1. Distribution of intention to reuse  
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Fig.2. Distribution of satisfaction about a lawsuit’s result 
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Table 1.  
 Construction of Research Sample 
 Description Number in 
Sample 
Original Sample 
 
 1512 
An individual 
 
  920 
A complainant 
 
  536 
Satisfaction and willingness to reuse  
(Dependent variables) 
 490 
Various independent variables.  360 
 
   Winners 
 
267  a 
   Losers 
 
93   a 
Note.  
a. The samples were used for the full-model estimations. 
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Table 2. 
Variable definitions and descriptive statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: 
a Billion yens. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables 
 
Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Max Min 
REUSE The degree of self-rated willingness to reuse ranges 
from 1 (not willing at all) to 5(willing very much).  
3.50 1.35 5 1 
SATIS The degree of self-rated satisfaction about a lawsuit’s 
result ranges from 1 (dissatisfied) to 5(very satisfied).  
3.18 1.43 5 1 
EXPE Number of trial experiences other than this one. 
 
0.91 3.65 50 0 
LAWYER Dummy variable: 1= employing a lawyer; 0 otherwise  0.81 
 
0.38 1 0 
AMOUNT a 
 
The amount of money involved in the lawsuit 1.66 23.2 400 0 
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Table 3. The expected effect of experience  
 
Channels  Learning Aspiration 
 
Satisfaction 
Winner +  ? 
 
Loser + - 
 
 
Reuse 
Winner + ? 
 
Loser 
 
+  - 
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Table 4 
Determinants of intention to reuse (OLS) 
(a) Winners 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE 0.05* 
(2.22) 
0.05* 
(2.03) 
0.05* 
(2.22) 
0.04* 
(2.05) 
LAWYER -0.29 
(-1.55) 
-0.25 
(-1.38) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
0.003* 
(1.74) 
 0.003* 
(1.87) 
 
Elasticity     
 REUSEEXPE1  0.01* 
(2.21) 
0.009* 
(2.02) 
0.01* 
(2.20) 
0.009* 
(2.03) 
 REUSEAMOUNT3  
 
0.002* 
(1.73) 
 0.002* 
(1.86) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
R- square 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Sample size 267 292 281 307 
 
(b) Losers 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE 0.03* 
(1.86) 
0.04** 
(2.50) 
0.03** 
(2.46) 
0.05** 
(3.28) 
LAWYER -0.27 
(-0.67) 
-0.34 
(-0.97) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
-4.34** 
(-3.18) 
 -4.11** 
(-3.14) 
 
Elasticity     
 REUSEEXPE1  0.02* 
(1.82) 
0.02** 
(2.45) 
0.02** 
(2.38) 
0.02** 
(3.18) 
 REUSEAMOUNT3  -0.03** 
(-3.22) 
 -0.03** 
(-3.17) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.25 0.20 0.24 0.19 
Sample size 93 111 98 116 
 
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the robust standard error. * and 
** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. a constant term is 
included in the estimations but not reported to save space. 
a YES means that dummy variables are included. 
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Table 5 
Determinants of satisfaction about the results of a lawsuit (OLS) 
(a) Winners 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE 0.05* 
(1.71) 
0.04 
(1.43) 
0.05* 
(1.78) 
0.04 
(1.47) 
LAWYER -0.19 
(-1.03) 
-0.13 
(-0.70) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
0.003* 
(2.23) 
 0.003* 
(2.15) 
 
Elasticity     
 SATISEXPE1  
 
0.01* 
(1.71) 
0.008 
(1.43) 
0.01* 
(1.78) 
0.008 
(1.47) 
 SATISAMOUNT3  
 
0.002* 
(2.21) 
 0.002* 
(2.14) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
R- square 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 
Sample size 267 292 281 307 
 
(b) Losers 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE -0.03** 
(-2.72) 
-0.03* 
(-2.22) 
-0.03** 
(-2.45) 
-0.02* 
(-2.00) 
LAWYER -0.43 
(-0.97) 
-0.33 
(-0.80) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
-2.93* 
(-2.35) 
 -2.96* 
(-2.32) 
 
Elasticity     
 SATISEXPE1  
 
-0.03** 
(-2.80) 
-0.02* 
(-2.24) 
-0.02** 
(-2.52) 
-0.01* 
(-2.01) 
 SATISAMOUNT3  
 
-0.03** 
(2.37) 
 -0.03** 
(2.33) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
R- square 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.13 
Sample size 93 111 98 116 
 
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the robust standard error. * and 
** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively. A constant term is 
included in the estimations but not reported to save space. 
a YES means that dummy variables are included. 
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Table A1  
List of variables (Those used for regression estimations but not reported) 
 
Categories Variables 
 
Definition 
GENDER MALE Dummy variable: 1= a complainant is male; 0 
otherwise  
 
AGE AGE20 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s age is between 20 
and 30 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 AGE30 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s age is between 30 
and 40 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 AGE40 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s age is between 40 
and 50 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 AGE50 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s age is between 50 
and 60 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 AGE60 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s age is between 60 
and 70 years old; 0 otherwise. 
 AGE70_ Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s age is over 70 
years old; 0 otherwise. 
EDU HIGH Dummy variable: 1= a complainant graduated from 
high school in the end; 0 otherwise. 
 VOCAT Dummy variable: 1= a complainant graduated from 
junior college or vocational school in the end; 0 
otherwise. 
 UNIVE Dummy variable: 1= a complainant graduated from 
university in the end; 0 otherwise. 
INCOM INC300 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is between 3 and 5 millions yens.; 0 otherwise. 
 INC500 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is between 5 and 8 millions yens.; 0 otherwise. 
 INC800 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is between 5 and 10 millions yens.; 0 
otherwise. 
 INC1000 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is between 10 and 15 millions yens.; 0 
otherwise. 
 INC1500 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is between 15 and 20 millions yens.; 0 
otherwise. 
 INC2000 Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is between 20 and 30 millions yens.; 0 
otherwise. 
 INC3000_ Dummy variable: 1= a complainant’s household 
income is 30 millions yens.; 0 otherwise. 
INCIDEN
T 
MONEY Dummy variable: 1=The lawsuit is concerned with 
money.; 0 otherwise. 
 LAND Dummy variable: 1=The lawsuit is concerned with 
land.; 0 otherwise. 
 ACCID Dummy variable: 1=The lawsuit is concerned with 
accident.; 0 otherwise. 
 DIV Dummy variable: 1=The lawsuit is concerned with 
divorce.; 0 otherwise. 
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Table A2 
Determinants of intention to reuse (Ordered Probit Model) 
(c) Winners 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE 0.05* 
(1.96) 
0.04* 
(1.71) 
0.06* 
(1.99) 
0.04* 
(1.76) 
LAWYER -0.28 
(-1.61) 
-0.25 
(-1.45) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
0.002 
(1.30) 
 0.002 
(1.42) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Sample size 267 292 281 307 
 
(d) Losers 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE 0.04* 
(1.88) 
0.05* 
(2.30) 
0.04* 
(2.17) 
0.05** 
(2.64) 
LAWYER -0.19 
(-0.60) 
-0.31 
(-1.13) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
-10.38** 
(-2.56) 
 -9.40** 
(-2.49) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 
Sample size 93 111 98 116 
 
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the robust standard error. * and 
** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  
a YES means that dummy variables are included. 
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Table A3 
Determinants of satisfaction about the results of a lawsuit (Ordered Probit Model) 
(c) Winners 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE 0.05 
(1.52) 
0.03 
(1.20) 
0.05 
(1.56) 
0.03 
(1.22) 
LAWYER -0.15 
(-0.96) 
-0.10 
(-0.63) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
0.003 
(1.59) 
 0.003 
(1.56) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 
Sample size 267 292 281 307 
 
(d) Losers 
Variables (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
EXPE -0.07** 
(-2.39) 
-0.06* 
(-2.21) 
-0.05** 
(-2.52) 
-0.04* 
(-2.13) 
LAWYER -0.35 
(-0.97) 
-0.35 
(-1.11) 
  
AMOUNT  
 
-7.87* 
(-2.30) 
 -7.99** 
(-2.43) 
 
Characteristics of a 
complainant a 
YES YES YES YES 
Kinds of incident a YES YES YES YES 
Pseudo R- square 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.05 
Sample size 93 111 98 116 
 
Numbers in parentheses are z-statistics calculated by the robust standard error. * and 
** indicate significance at 5 and 1 per cent levels, respectively.  
a YES means that dummy variables are included. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
